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This paper evaluates the Planning Phase of the Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) used in the
Department of Defense (DOD). The evaluation includes the
evolution of the PPBS and the participants in the Planning
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Sy stem • ( PPBS
)
is not a new idea. It had been proposed as a form of
budgeting in the federal government as early as 1954, but
was not used because of political conflict until the time of
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. "Program budgeting was
not widely used in government until Charles Hitch and Robert
McNamara employed a variation of the technique, the Plan-
ning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) in the Department
of Defense (DOD) in 1961." [Ref. l:p. 37] In the twenty-
five years that have elapsed since then, PPBS has persisted.
PPBS is a system of budgeting which identifies a
problem, plans its solution, programs the best solution, and
provides money for the program through a budget. Brundage
feels the "object of PPB (Planning-Programming-Budgeting) is
simply to apply accounting and economic analyses to help
arrive at the best decisions in the allocation of available
resources." [Ref. 2:p. 62] Mosher in turn believes that
"much public budgeting is ^historical', a mere transfer
forward of the past into the future." [Ref. 3:p. 47]
What to budget for in the DOD is of paramount concern to
the security and survival of the nation. Augustine stated
that to prepare to fight a short war or a long war, we "must
do some serious planning backed with actions." [Ref.
4:p. xiv] Kings ton-McCloughry has noted "it is a mistake to
have any preconceived ideas about what will happen in
diplomacy and war." [Ref. 5:p. xi] Additionally, "to
prepare for the next war with the weapons of the last can
lead to disaster in mobilization policy as in military
strategy." [Ref. 6:p. v]
The nation's leaders are responsible for its defense, and
as such must determine the optimal course of action to
safeguard the country. Towle best sums up the problems
facing the nation's leaders: "Preparing for war and
assessing the military power of potential enemies and allies
are the two most important and most difficult tasks of the
armed forces in peacetime." [Ref. 7: p. 11] Determining the
strengths and weaknesses of an enemy go far in determining
the assets needed to counter him. Hitch and McKean assert
that two common mistakes in dealing with the enemy are to
regard him as stupid, inflexible, and lacking in initiative,
and to regard him as diabolically cunning, with unlimited
flexibility, and with boundless initiative. [Ref. 8:p. 164]
In assessing an enemy's capabilities, McNamara believed
that it was not essential that the enemy make decisions on
the same basis we do, but that we must try to anticipate
what the enemy forces will be and how he will apply them.
[Ref. 9:p. 36] Because of the rapid evolution of technology.
it is a major consideration in national security, more urgent
when envisioning a major war. [Ref. 10:p. 33]
In assessing an enemy, the scientific and technologic
capabilities must be considered. Aron, the French writer,
points out that care must be exercised in evaluating
capabilities or the result could be no "difference between
Switzerland and China, thanks to the equalizing power of the
atom." [Ref. ll:p. 105] Additionally, economic and
political capabilities of a potential enemy must also be
considered. Brown and Korb believe there are eight
interrelated economic and political factors which must be
considered in development of a budget for national security:
1. This nation does not have the resources to support
fully our present military policy.
2. Responsible political leaders are rarely able to
provide concrete guidance to out military leaders on
how this country will respond in specific situations.
3. The length of time involved in the production of the
defense budget can make outmoded or irrelevant any
policy guidance that may have been given,
4. Because of its enormous size, the defense budget can
have a dramatic effect upon the economic health of the
nation
.
5. There is no purely scientific way of allocating
limited resources to support a particular national
security policy.
6. Even if all the right decision-making tools were
available, the scope of the defense budget is simply
too vast for any one central authority to administer
in a coherent manner.
7. The output of the defense budget process is severely
constrained by political realities.
8. Present policy options are often constrained by past
budgetary decision
.[ Ref . 12:pp. 581-584]
All eight of these factors must be considered in
preparing a budget for national defense. The PPBS used
within DOD relies heavily upon the Planning Phase to obtain
a budget. This thesis uses a review of available literature
to define how planning is formalized in the PPBS process.
Chapter Two will explain PPBS in greater detail and
emphasize the importance of Planning to this process.
Chapter Three will focus on the evolution of budget
formulation. Chapter Four will explain the role of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in the Planning process.
Chapter Five will explain the role of the National Security
Council (NSC) in the planning process. Chapter Six will
explain the role of other contributors to the planning
process. Chapter Seven will conclude with a description of
current concerns in the Planning process.
II. THE PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING SYSTEM (PPBS)
A. OVERVIEW
PPBS was intended to force all agencies in the federal
government to define objectives and the cost of those
objectives by using analysis. The results of the analysis
would then become the agency's program and be integrated
with conventional budgets. This .programmed budget would
thus communicate to people inside and outside the agency
what the organization was trying to do and how it was going
to accomplish the objectives. [Ref. 13: p. 289]
Politicians know that to get something done in a
bureaucracy takes commitment from agencies which will carry
out assigned policy. Schlesinger put it very succintly when
he stated "Political leaders are keenly aware that in
formulating policy you must start from where you are." [Ref.
lA:p. 310] PPBS seemed an answer to the problem between
policy formulation and its execution. President Johnson had
great faith in PPBS, believing that once in operation it
would:
1. Identify our national goals with precision and on a
continuing basis;
2. Choose among those goals the ones that are most
urgent ;
3. Search for alternative means of reaching those goals
most effectively at the least cost;
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4. Inform ourselves not merely on next year's costs- but
on the second, and third, and subsequent year's costs-
of our programs
;
5. Measure the performance of our programs to ensure a
dollar's worth of service for each dollar spent. [Ref.
15:p. 63]
Unfortunately, President Johnson was not the only player
impacting on PPBS ; Congress was involved in the Budgeting
Phase. The political conflicts in Congress and within
agencies did not allow PPBS to succeed outside DOD.
Other writers held beliefs similar to President
Johnson's. The Otts believe the hallmarks of PPBS are:
1. Specification of the objectives to be achieved through
federal spending.
2. Investigation of alternative means of achieving the
objective .
3. Minimization of the costs or comparison of costs and
benefits.
4. Systematic use of analysis throughout the process.
[Ref. 16:p. 25]
All these hallmarks are found in the DOD budget process.
Charles Schultze, the Director of the Bureau of the
Budget, was also committed to the success of PPBS. He
identified six goals of that budget system:
1 . Careful identification and examination of goals and
objectives in each major area of government activity.
2. Analyze the output of a given program in terms of its
objectives .
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3. Measurement of total program cost, not for just one
year but for at least several years ahead. [Provide
the design maker with all the relevant costs that his
decision would entail.]
4. Formulation of objectives and programs extending
beyond the single year of the annual budget
submission .
5. Analysis of alternatives to find the most effective
means of reaching basic program objectives, and to
achieve these objectives for the least cost.
6. The establishment of analytic procedures as a
systematic part of budget review. [Ref. 17:pp. 19-23]
The goals were largely met in DOD, but the crucial aim (item
5) was handicappted by politics in the Congress. As a
result, the whole PPBS process was given only token
consideration outside DOD.
PPBS can be condensed into three basic ideas, identified
by the Musgraves:
1. There is a need to look at the program and planning
unit as a whole
.
2. A proper evaluation of an expenditure program requires
scrutiny of more than one time period.
3. Cost-benefit analysis should be applied where feasible
and expenditure programs should be evaluated in these
terms. [Ref. 18:pp. 198-199]
The principal objective of PPBS is to improve the basis
for major program decisions. [Ref. 19:p. 1] To achieve this
objective, PPBS requires support built around three
documents defined as follows:
1. Program Memoranda (PM) - presents the agency head's
major program recommendations to the President within
a framework of agency objectives, identify
12
alternatives, and support decisions of the basis of
their contribution to the achievement of the
objectives .
2. Program and Financial Plan (PFP) - presents in tabular
form a complete and authoritative summary of agency
programs in terms of their outputs and costs.
3. Special Studies (SS) - provide analytic groundwork to
decisions reported in the Program Memoranda. [Ref. 20:
p. 2]
Considerations other than the enemy threat must also be
made. Kingston-McCloughr y noted that "the state of a
nation's economy has always been a controlling factor in the
size and shape of her armed forces." [Ref.21:p. 5] In order
to achieve national security, yet remain within the bounds
established by the nation's economy, a system must be
established which can account for alternatives and costs.
PPBS is the result.
B. PLANNING
Webster defines planning as:
A method of achieving something: a way of carrying out
a design; a detailed and systematic formulation of a large
scale campaign or program of action; a proposed
undertaking or goal. [Ref. 22:p. 1729]
Euske has stated that the "purpose of a plan is to bring
about behavior that leads to desired outcomes." [Ref.
23:p. 15] To achieve the desired outcomes the plan must:
1. Describe some actions and outcomes.
2. Serve as a formal vehicle of communications [Ref. 24:p
17].
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There are several other acceptable definitions of
planning. "The orthodox expectation in planning is the
development of a strategic plan followed by a determination
of requirements for carrying it out." [Ref. 25:p. 25] The
systems approach to planning holds as its first
consideration the selection of mission or objective. [Ref.
26:p. 501] Novick believes that in planning "one seeks a
continual review of objectives and the means for their
attainment." [Ref. 27:p. 2] He also believes that "planning
is the selection of courses of action through a schematic
consideration of alternatives." [Ref. 28:p. 2] Smith best
sums up planning as "deciding in advance what you intend to
do and how you intend to do it." [Ref. 29:p. 113]
Schick defines strategic planning as "the process of
deciding on objectives of the organization, on changes in
these objectives, and on the policies that are to govern the
acquisition, use, and disposition of these resources." [Ref.
30:p. 2] "The plan represents the agency head's judgment on
what the agency's future course of action should be to meet
those national needs with which his agency is concerned."
[Ref. 31:p. 1]
Planning is the first phase in the PPBS process. "In
the planning phase the role and posture of the United States
and the DOD in the world environment are examined, with
14
particular emphasis on Presidential policies." [Ref. 32:p.




3. Formulate strategy to satisfy objectives in face of
all obstacles .
4. Allocate resources to cover requirements without
intolerable risk.
5. Review alternatives, if available assets are
insufficient to support preferred concepts. [Ref. 33:
p. 3]
There are some minor disagreements of what planning is
in the budget process. Evans holds that planning is "the
process of determining military objectives and corresponding
force requirements" [Ref. 3A:p. 5], while Fincher includes
"assessment of the threat, determining strategy or
approaches for countering the threats and identifying the
capabilities (manpower, money and systems) required to
support the different strategies or approaches." [Ref.
35:pp. 4-5]
National defense policy is built around a strategic
concept crucial to national survival. Hitch and McKean have
observed that every type of war is fought in a strategic
context, "at a certain time and place, with certain enemies
and allies, to achieve certain political objectives." [Ref.
36:pp. 189-190] To solve the strategic problem, a document
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is developed in DOD called Defense Guidance. The
Defense Guidance document contains threat assessment ,' policy
guidance, and strategy guidance, and is the culminating step
in planning activities. [Ref. 37:p. 21] Strategic planning
would be of considerable importance in preparing to counter
a goal stated by Breshnev; "capture the two great treasure
houses of the Western world, Persian Gulf oil and the
mineral wealth of Southern Africa." [Ref. 38:pp. 18-19]
The high economic and political stakes in countering
threats to national survival lead to an obvious conclusion:
"planning is a big element in the process of an organiza-
tion." [Ref. 39:p. 17] The Planning Phase covers mid-term
of the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) plus a ten year
extended planning period called long-term. [Ref. 40:p. 3]
While a statement of work and the product design are the
basis of a program-manufacturing plan [Ref. 41:p. A-8],
planning for the security of the United States starts with
an assessment of the threat and culminates with the forecast
of force objectives to assure security. [Ref. A2:p. 11-13]
There are two important documents produced in the
Planning Phase: the Joint Strategic Planning Document and
the Defense Guidance. The Joint Strategic Planning Document
(JSPD) is the "consolidated service input to OSD (Office of
Secretary of Defense) planning. . . composed by the JCS
(Joint Chiefs of Staff) from service inputs." [Ref. 43:p. 5]
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The Defense Guidance is "the end product of the planning
phase and services as the OSD guidance document for the
programming phase." [Ref. 4A:p. 5]
C. PROGRAMMING
Webster defines a program as:
a brief outline or explanation of the order to be pursued
or subjects embraced in a public exercise, performance, or
entertainment; a plan of procedure; a schedule or system
under which action may be taken toward a desired goal: a
proposed project or scheme. [Ref. A5:p. 1812]
Programming has been defined by several authors, all of
whom agree that this process follows planning. Mosher
interprets planning as conceiving goals and alternatives for
future action, and programming as the reduction of
alternatives to an approved course of action, the program.
[Ref. 46:p. 48] Novick believes that programming involves
translating preferred alternatives into forces, manpower,
and dollar costs projected over a five-year period [Ref.
47:p. 2] or "the more specific determination of the
manpower, material, end facilities necessary for
accomplishing a program." [Ref. 48: p. 2]
DOD has more specific considerations in the programming
phase. Clark and Legere identify the "perennially central
question of Defense Department programming: How much is
enough - i.e., what amounts of what kinds of defense (not
how much army or navy or air force) are we buying?" [Ref,
17
49:p. 185] Evans states that programming is a process of
translating objectives identified during planning into time-
phased resource requirements [Ref. 50:p. 5], while
Buragardner believes the Programming Phase "balances the
proper mix of forces, munitions, training, facilities,
communications systems and support against available
funding." [Ref. 51:p. 6] Fincher believes that programming
involves translating the general plan approved in the
Planning Phase into specific weapon system programs,
including system description and funding estimates. He also
identifies three efforts during the programming phase:
1. Preparation of the Service Program Objective
Memorandum (POM). This is the service (Army, Navy, or
Air Force) FYDP.
2. Preparation of a recommended service input for the
President's annual fiscal year budget.
3. The Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) process
involving the service secretaries and the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD). [Ref. 52:p. 5]
Programs can be reduced to very small components.
Kramer believes that all programs in the federal government
can be broken down into distinct elements and put together
to contribute to larger programs. He states that each
agency's mission consists of several program categories; the
submissions would then be program subcategories, and the
program subcategories are made up of program elements. [Ref.
53:pp. 38-39]
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The POM is each service's response to the Defense
Guidance which resulted from the Planning Phase. A POM is a
prioritized list of requested programs which takes into
account fiscal constraints, reasons for deviations from
the FYDP , and assessment of differences between planning
ideals and the realities of resource availability. [Ref.
54:p. 6]
D. BUDGETING
Webster defines a budget as:
a statement of the financial position of a sovereign body
for a definite period of time based on detailed estimates
of planned or expected expenditure during the period and
proposals for financing them. [Ref. 55:p. 290]
There are several interpretations of budgeting. Evans
considers budgeting as "the process of transferring required
resources into defense spending requests" [Ref. 56:p. 5],
while Fincher believes budgeting involves the definition,
approval, and execution of the service budget. [Ref. 57:p.
5]
Rovitch and Gaskie identify four essential steps in
budget construction:
1. Define what is to be achieved (the Goal).
2. Define the ways and the timetable by which it is to be
achieved (the Plan and Program).
3. Determine the costs for each step to be taken (the
Budget) .
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4. Devise a yardstick to measure whether the goal is
actually being achieved through the budgeted program
(the Performance Measure). [Ref. 58:p. 11]
Of these four steps, the Planning Process in DOD is most
concerned with Steps 1 and 2. Step 3 is dependent upon the
assets Congress is willing to provide.
As with other phases of PPBS, budgeting is a process
which is defined differently by each author. Budgeting, as
identified by Mosher, "lays an emphasis upon the idea of
balancing: of proposed activities with their probable costs;
and of competing activities among each other, in relation to
the costs of each other." [Ref. 59:p. 48] Dawson expresses
budgeting as "a device whereby the same phenomena and the
same ideas are progressively translated into differing
levels of meaning." [Ref. 60:p. 2] Buragardner, however,
states that the budgeting phase of PPBS, establishes the
final costs for DOD in the President's Budget. He
identifies the main components of the Budgeting Phase as
budget estimate submissions, budget issues, and program
budget decisions. [Ref. 61:p. 7] Although budgeting is
defined in many different ways it has one item of concern:
cost. Therefore, Budgeting can be considered an attempt to
achieve a goal most efficiently at the given cost.
E. SUMMARY
PPBS is the budgeting process used in DOD. Identifica-
tion of national priorities are established by the President,
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The Planning Phase identifies threats to national security,
proposes counters to these threats, and establishes
priorities. The Programming Phase identifies a course of
action among the program proposals from the Planning Phase.
The Budgeting Phase establishes the final cost of the
program
.
The PPBS process is a link between military plans and
requirements and the national economy because the process
"represents a fusion - and often a compromise - of military
policy objectives, strategy, and the means of implementing
them and a relationship of these factors to other areas of




Military planning has always been an important
consideration in national defense. The importance of
planning has "been traced to the earliest armies in recorded
history." [Ref. 63:p. 50] This chapter will explain the
evolution of planning in the United States defense
organization .
A budget process did not exist in the United States
until 1921. Kramer notes that it is difficult to believe
large governments could operate without guidance or
coordination from a central budgeting officer. He points
out that the Budget and Accounting Act of 1920 did establish
a central budgeting officer in 1921. [Ref. 64:p. 10]
The federal government has become deeply involved in the
national economy following the stock market crash in 1929.
Dawson has pointed to the increased role of the federal
government in fine-tuning the economy since World War II.
In particular, he cited the Legislative Reorganization Act
in 1946 as a turning point: "since 19A6, the macroeconomic
aspects of the budget have been predominantly a Presidential
product." [Ref. 65:p. 6] As will be shown later in this
chapter, the Planning Phase of PPBS has become more cen-
tralized, from wartime experiences and economic necessity.
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This chapter will cover the following time periods: pre
World War II, World War II, and 1945 to the present.
B. PRE-WORLD WAR II
The United States did not devote many assets to the
national defense until it became involved in World War I.
Yoshpe interprets the experience of economic planning in the
United States with the frontier style self-sufficiency until
the enormity of full scale war compelled regimentation of
the economy. As Yoshpe observed, "military needs changed
from month to month, and then changes required adjustments
reaching deep into the industrial life." [Ref. 65:p. 26]
For the first time there was a requirement for central
planning of military requirements with national economy.
The War Industries Board (WIB) was established to ensure
coordination of resources through analysis of data,
"altering and restraining the demands of the Government, the
Allies, and the public." [Ref. 67: p. 27]
Economic expansion of the United States following the
Civil War was made with little consideration for national
defense. "Before World War I, no plans for the use of in-
dustry in a major war had been drawn up." [Ref. 68:p. 4]
During the War, centralized planning was employed for the
first time. Additionally, income taxes became a permanent
2 3
part of the American landscape and "improved the productivity
of the national revenue system." [Ref. 69:p. 59]
Planning for war during peacetime became standard
practice after World War I. "Before World War II, in the
1920's and 1930's, much planning took place in respect to
military procurement, economic controls, and control
agencies." [Ref. 70:p. 4] Mosher noted significant strides
in organizing and developing strategic and mobilization
plans, in particular the establishment of a War Plans
Division and the Joint Army and Navy Board. [Ref. 71:p. 52]
All the plans developed prior to World War II were
inadequate. In addition to the political uncertainties and
international realities, Mosher also adds "organizational
uncertainty, lack of clear-cut responsibilities and
relationships in the difficult task of converting a peaceful
nation to a military nation." [Ref. 72:p. 53]
C. WORLD WAR II
Long-range planning is far more difficult than short-range
planning because long-range planning must consider social
and scientific evolution and changes in mass psychology,
while short-range planning does not. [Ref. 73:p. 22]
Williams cited the decades of planning that pre-dated World
War I (long-range) with the cross-channel invasion in 1944
(short-range) as examples of the planning problem.
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Another important consideration in planning during World
War II was the immense scientific advances made due to
mobilization of the nation, which in turn "stimulates men to
bring to fruition many unfinished projects and to conceive,
under pressure of fear for the national safety, bold new
ideas." [Ref. 74:p. 39] Financial returns are irrelevant
during such times, which permit great strides in technology.
One of the best examples of scientific breakthrough is
the development of the atomic bomb.
Prior to World War II, the budget and planning channels
were kept separate. Budgeting was a tool of the civilian
leadership while the military leadership was responsible for
planning. "World War II altered the situation basically in
that the budgeting of dollars ceased to be a significant
factor of control or planning." [Ref. 75:p. 56]
The Planning done during World War II can best be
described by the Army's example:
As the strategic planning staff for General Marshall in
his capacity as both Chief of Staff of the Array and member
of the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff) and the CCS (Combined
Chiefs of Staff), OPD (Operations Division) helped lay
down the foundations of strategy and military policy
which, once approved by the Chief of Staff or the JCS or
the CCS, provided a frame of reference for the guidance of
Army activities both in the theaters of operation and in
the zone of interior. [Ref. 76:p. 28]
Since money was not an obstacle in resource planning,
the planning made during World War II was done with military
considerations foremost. Two significant outcomes of this
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were organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
establishment of unified commands. [Ref . 11:^. 48]
D. 1945-PRESENT
A Department of National Defense was first proposed by
President Truman in 19A5. [Ref. 78:p. 48] Truman hoped to
unify military strategy, program and budget. The Army's
proposed unification plan, which, was called the Collins
Plan, called for a common supply system for three services
(air, sea, land). The Navy called for continuance of
existing structure, with formation of a National Security
Council, a National Resources Planning Board, a Joint Chiefs
of Staff, and a Military Munitions Board. The end result
was the National Security Act of 1947, which created a
Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 79:p. 88] An amendment to the
act in 1949 created the Department of Defense. [Ref. 80:p.
174]
DOD has evolved into three separate services (Array,
Navy, Air Force) headed by a Secretary of Defense. [Ref.
81:p. 49] However, Mosher emphasized four positive aspects
of the National Security Act:
1. Planning and budgeting have become centralized.
2. Correlation and integration of planning and
programming processes are now common.
3. Planning procedures are tailored to requiremetns of
the budget cycle. Budget in a dominant concern of
central military staffs.
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4. Larger organization created by this process makes
programming and budgeting processes more complex.
[Ref. 82:pp. 57-58]
In 1953 and 1958 amendments to the National Security Act
shifted authority and responsibility to the Secretary of
Defense and collective Joint Chiefs of Staff and away from
the separate services. Additionally, the service departments
were confined to administrative, training, and logistical
functions. [Ref. 83:p. 175]
Planning during this time frame evolved from a top-down
approach. The Joint Chiefs of Staff divide plans into long-
range, short-range, and medium-range plans. The services
then take these plans and launch their own internal planning
activities. Plans are best summarized by Mosher:
1
.
Long-range plans are projected annually a number of
years in advance, and are useful and necessary
especially for guidance of research and development
activities .
2. Short-range plans are prepared annually and are
designed to guide current operations and to provide
immediate plans in the event of emergency. These
plans are based on currently available resources
(unlike long-range plans).
3. Medium-range plans are designed to translate national
policy into strategy and objectives that are
considered to be attainable. These plans are midway
between long- and short-range plans in both time
covered and planning approach. Medium-range plans are
most important from a budget standpoint because they
provide the logic for most programming of services,
for the preparation of the annual budget, and for
mobilization planning. [Ref. 84: p. 62]
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Mosher has identified several planning difficulties:
1. The distance in time between development of the plan
and the period it applies.
2. The tremendous complexity of the system.
3. Divorce between military planning and budgetary
planning. [Ref. 85:p. 63]
The budget process identified by Mosher applied until
1961 when PPBS was introduced in.DOD. Mosher holds that the
budget process previous to 1961 was a system of
communications which followed four sequential steps of
objectives, plans, authorization of means, and operations.
The sequential movement of the budget is characterized by
coordination, consolidation, and generalization in upward
flow (bottom-up) and by interpretation and specification in
downward flow (top-down). [Ref. 86:p. 133]
PPBS imposed on DOD makes the budget system into an
evolving process. Clark and Legere believe that the
"McNaraara Revolution" in DOD is the result of evolution from
a process which started in the 1940's. McNamara wanted to
introduce new analytic techniques to replace the
traditional, mainly verbal-philosophical methods of the past
and create a strong staff within the Secretary of Defense
Office which could exercise those techniques. The results




The Spanish-American War disclosed glaring deficiencies
in the American military, particularly in the area of
military planning and direction. A general staff was
authorized by Congress on 15 August 1903 to correct that
deficiency. However, the bureaus (ordnance, signal corps,
engineers, etc.) resisted the changes. This resistance was
supported by Congress, so a general staff never evolved.
[Ref. 88:p. 16]
The budget process evolved through two World Wars and a
major organizational change in 1947. The logical outcome
which was foreseen by Mosher was PPBS
.
Vision and balance are perhaps the two most necessary
skills of the art of governing.
Vision is the ability to look beyond today's practice -
which is usually founded on yesterdays problems; and to
see what kind of tomorrow is likely or possible, and to
think about what to do about that.
Balance is the capability of continuing to nurture
those established programs which have a continuing claim
on the public purse because they meet a continuing need,
while fostering those new programs whose claim is that
they can keep the present bearable while aiming at making
the future brighter. [Ref. 89:p. v]
Good planning is the key to a successful budget process
Additionally, as Euske observed, "a process needs to be
created ahead of time so that when the unexpected occurs, a
meansexists for adjusting to the situation." [Ref. 90:p.
18]
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From the President's Commission on Economy and
Efficiency (1909-12), which embraced the need for a national
budget, [Ref. 91:p. 4] we have seen the evolution of the
Defense budget process to its present form.
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IV. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JCS)
A. BACKGROUND
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are subject to the
authority and direction of the President and Secretary of
Defense. Subject to that authority, the JCS shall:
1. Prepare strategic plans and provide for the strategic
direction of the armed forces.
2. Prepare joint logistic plans and assign logistic
responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance
with those plans.
3. Establish unified commands in strategic areas.
4. Review the major material and personnel requirements
of the armed forces in accordance with strategic and
logistic plans.
5. Formulate policies for the joint training of the armed
forces
.
6. Formulate policies for coordinating the military
education of members of the armed forces.
7. Provide for representation of the United States on the
Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
8. perform such other duties as the President or the
Secretary of Defense may prescribe. [Ref. 92:pp. 263-
264]
Collins believes that the foremost function performed by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is the preparation of strategic
plans and strategic direction of the armed forces. [Ref.
93:p. 49] Included in this function is the Planning Phase
of PPBS.
31
The membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is composed of
the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of
Staff, U. S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of
Staff, U.S. Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine
Corps. [Ref. 94:p. 332] Ries quoted Huntington concerning
the JCS in drawing attention to the fact that the JCS was
Born to power in wartime and antedating all other central
defense institutions by six years with Congressional passage
of the National Security Act of 1947. [Ref. 95:p. 100]
Clark and Legere see the JCS as fulfilling four roles:
1. Principal military advisor to the President, the
Secretary of Defense, and the National Security
Council
.
2. To serve as the military operational staff for the
Secretary of Defense (staff link in the chair between
the Secretary of Defense and specified commands).
3. Planning and programming the military forces and
material it believes will be required in the future,
given the policy objectives of the nation.
A. Individual roles as the nation's senior soldier,
sailor and airman, each responsible to the secretary
of his particular service. [Ref. 96:pp. 180-181]
Of primary concern is role 3, as this role contributes
to the military budget. Clark and Legere also observed that
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) has several
responsibilities, principally as spokesman for the JCS. He
is one among equals within the JCS, with little authority
derived from statutes and directives. [Ref. 97:p. 182]
President Reagan, as reported in the New York Times, in an
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attempt to improve communications between the Secretary of
Defense and field commanders directed that these commanders
report directly to the chairman of the JCS rather than
filter through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [Ref. 98:p. A18]
There are several movements within Congress to modify the
JCS and strengthen the role of Chairman, however revisions
to the National Security Act of 1947, and in particular the
function of JCS are not new -- two major revisions occurred
during the 1950's. [Ref. 99:p. 179]
One question of this thesis is how much do the JCS
participate in PPBS , in particular the Planning Phase. The
observation that the budget does not give us within the
desired time the strength necessary for national security is
the same now as it was thirty years ago. [Ref. 100:p. 28]
The JCS must still strive with limited resources to achieve
national security. Planning is a key phase toward attaining
that goal.
B. DEFENSE GUIDANCE
The PPBS cycle has evolved over the past quarter-century
at the direction of Congress. Beckstead observed that the
PPBS cycle for a given fiscal year begins in late summer,
two years before the beginning of that fiscal year. The
planning phase is part of the FYDP, even though focus is one
a given fiscal year. [Ref. 101:p. 20] The FYDP is formulated
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annually, based on the Secretary of Defense's response to
the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submitted by military
departments. The FYDP projects force requirements for eight
years and manpower cost data for five years. [Ref. 102:p. I-
2]
The Defense Guidance "provides the centralized framework
for the planning process." [Ref. 103:p. 21] Beckstead notes
that this document consists of three major elements: threat
assessment, policy guidance, and strategy guidance.
Published in January, the Defense Guidance is the authority
for directing defense policy, strategy, force, resource
planning, and fiscal guidance. [Ref. 104:p. 21] Inputs to
the Defense Guidance come from DOD components. These inputs
include the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD), Threat
Assessment, Policy, Strategy, and Force Planning Guidance.
The Defense Resources Board reviews comments from DOD
components and drafts a recommendation to match strategy
capabilities with threat for the Secretary of Defense's
review and approval. [Ref. 105:p. 21]
The Defense Guidance is published in January. It causes
a transition from the planning to the Programming Phase.
Each military department and defense agency prepares and
submits POM to the Secretary of Defense based on the policy
and fiscal recommendation of Defense Guidance. [Ref. 106:p.
22] The JCS submit a Joint Program Assessment Memorandum
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( JPAM) , which is a risk assessment of the POM (defense
capabilities within funding constraints), to the Secretary
of Defense shortly after POM submission. [Ref. 107:p. 22]
Secretary Brown confirmed that the JPAM was "an important
factor in determining ray recommendations to the President on
the Service programs." [Ref. 108:p. A]
General Taylor, in testimony before Congress, confirmed .
Secretary of Defense McNamara's assertion that a Chief has
the right to appeal to Congress or the President on behalf
of his service. He stated that the JCS advised not only the
Secretary of Defense but also the National Security Council
and the President, which made it clear that the JCS has the
right to direct approach to the President. [Ref. 109:p. 59]
This right of appeal has certainly been confirmed by a
recent publication in the New York Times which disagreed
with President Reagan's assertion concerning Soviet cheating
on arms control. The JCS assert that the Soviets are in
compliance with the requirements of the Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaty (SALT II), while the President reports the
Soviets have exceeded the treaty limits. This article
implies that either the JCS is incorrect or the intelligence
agency which gave the President his data is in error. [Ref.
110:p. 6]
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C. JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM (JSPS)
Planning involves a continual review of objectives and
the means for their attainment. The preferred alternative
will remain that way only if information continues to
support that alternative above its competition. [Ref. lll:p.
12]
With that broad guidance, Secretary Weinberger set forth
the basic aims of the Defense Guidance:
1. Prevent the coercion of the United States, its allies
and friends .
2. Be capable of protecting U . S. interests and U. S.
citizens abroad.
3. Maintain access to critical resources around the
globe, including petroleum.
4. Oppose the geographic expansion of Soviet control and
military presence world-wide, particularly where such
presence threatens our geo-strategic position.
5. Encourage long-term political and military changes
within the Soviet empire that will facilitate building
a more peaceful and secure world order. [Ref. 112;p.
19]
A DOD directive stated the focus of the Planning Phase
will be on the following objectives:
1. Define the national military strategy necessary to
help maintain national security and support U. S.
foreign policy 2 to 7 years in the future.
2. Plan the integrated and balanced military forces
necessary to accomplish that strategy.
3. Ensure the necessary framework (including priorities)
to manage DOD resources effectively for successful
mission accomplishment consistent within national
resources limitations;
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4. Provide decision options to the Secretary of Defense
to help him assess the role of national defense in the
formulation of national security policy and related
decisions. [Ref. 113:p. 2]
The Joint Long Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA), the
Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD), and the Military
Department's Long Range Plans are the fundamental documents
in the Planning Phase and represent independent strategy,
advice, and recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
Military Departments to the Defense Guidance for mid-terra
and long-term. [Ref. 114:pp. 3-4]
The fundamental Planning Phase document combine to form
a Joint Strategic Planning System. Bischoff believes the
Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is the primary
vehicle for developing military advice and introducing it
into the DOD PPBS. He defines JSPS as a "conceptual
aggregation of specific strategic planning documents
developed over time to fulfill the statutory
responsibilities of the JCS by providing military advise to
the President and the Secretary of Defense." [Ref. 115:p. 7]
The plans developed within DOD normally do not project
beyond twenty years into the future. "The JCS develops and
keeps up to date three separate plans-- long-range (11-20
years), mid-range (3-10 years) and short-range (less than 2
years)." [Ref. 116:p. 58] These plans include "minimum risk
force" (which is fully structural, supported and manned
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force required to achieve national military objectives with
minimum risk) and "planning force" (which has prioritized
missions, duplicate threats eliminated, force employed in
sequenced to carry out strategy at increased level of risk
while retaining reasonable insurance of success). The
"minimum risk force" is fiscally unconstrained while the
"planning force" is the one contained in the Joint Strategic
Planning Document (JSPD) [Ref. 117:p. 7]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) promulgate several
documents as a planning framework. Fincher believes the JCS
are charged with planning responsibilities which are
discharged by promulgation of seven documents represented in
three areas: strategy, intelligence, and research and
development. [Ref. 118:p. 79] "The JCS established the
Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) in 1952 to serve as a
framework for developing military advice on resource
allocation considerations and converting national security
policy into strategic guidance." [Ref. 119:p. 16] The Navy
Programming Manual identifies the seven studies and plans
prepared by the JCS as follows:
1 . Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning (JIEP).
Describes situations and developments throughout the
world that could affect U. S. security interests in
the short and mid-range periods (present- 10 years).
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Intelligence PrioFities for Strategic Planning (IPSP).
Establishes comprehensive military intelligence sub-
jects, targets and priorities for the short and mid-
range period, (present - 10 years).
Joint Long-Range Estimative Intelligence Document
(JLREID) .
Summarizes factors and trends in world power relation-
ships and assesses the capabilities of important
foreign nations. (Covers long-range period, 11-20
years)
.
Joint Long-Range Strategic Studies (JLRSS).
Source document delineating JCS concepts concerning
role of U.S. Military power in long-range period as
well as outlining broad strategic implications which
should be considered in studies, estimates,
appraisals, policies, plans, and R&D objectives.
(Covers long-range period, 11-20 years.)
Joint Long-Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA).
Consolidate estimative intelligence, U.S. strategic
forecasts, broad force structuring implications and




Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD)
Provides the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
the President, National Security Council, and the
Secretary of Defense on the military strategy and
force structure required to attain the national
security objectives of the United States. (Covers raid-
range period, 3-10 years.)
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan JSCP).
Provides guidance to the Commanders of the Unified and
Specified Commands and the Service Chiefs for the
accomplishment of military tasks, based on military
capabilities, conditions, and programmed force levels.
Allocates the programmed forces to the Unified and
Specified Commanders for planning purposes based on
the case scenarios in the current CO (Consolidated
Guidance). (Covers short-range period, present-2
years.) [Ref. 120:pp. II-1-II-3]
39
The document of most concern in the defense budget
process is the JSPD because it is directed to high level
decision makers and covers a critical time period for weapon
system acquisition. According to Bischoff, the JSPD is the
one designed to influence development of Defense Guidance,
and thus most greatly impacts the planning phase. [Ref.
121:p. 7] The JSPD is derived from the JSPD Supporting
Analysis (JSPDSA), which is an internal JCS document which
provides the basis for JSPD and establishes the JCS position
on national security matters. [Ref. 122:p. II-8]
Part I of the JSPDSA includes military strategy, plan-
ning guidance for development of planning force levels, and
specific guidance for scope, format, phasing and forwarding
of input into Part II. Part II will develop required plan-
ning force and support levels for strategic, general pur-
pose, and allied and friendly forces. [Ref. 123:p. II-8]
From the Defense Guidance that evolves from the planning
phase, a POM is prepared. This POM represents proposals on
programs for forces, manpower, equipment and logistic sup-
port to meet the objectives in the Defense Guidance. [Ref.
12A:p. 7] The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is
therefore critical to the military process.
D. SUMMARY
There are many critics and criticisms of the Defense
Budget. "Military departments have been encouraged to ^build
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up a case' for what they think they may need rather than to
work from what they reasonably expect they may be granted."
[Ref. 125:pp. 45-46] Although these words are meant as a
criticism, the Planning Phase of PPBS is more concerned with
the threat to the nation and resources needed to counter
that threat than the cost.
The Planning Phase of PPBS is a major concern of the
JCS . "Planning starts with the assessment of the threat to
the United States and culminates with the forecast of force
objectives to assure that security." [Ref. 126:p. 11-13]
The seven planning documents that make up the JSPS . The
JSPD is drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and used
to influence development of Defense Guidance in the Office
of Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 127:p. 7]. Additionally, the
planning phase of the PPBS annual cycle is initiated with
submission of the JSPD by the JCS. [Ref. 128: p. II-l]
The Defense Guidance provides a transition from planning
to programming and is the annual statement of the Secretary
of Defense concerning policy, strategy, force structure and
fiscal planning guidance from which Military Services and
Defense Agencies prepare the POM which is a key document in
the programming phase in PPBS. [Ref. 129:p. 7] The Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) thus play a key role in developing a
budget for defense of the nation.
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V. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC)
A. BACKGROUND
The National Security Council (NSC) was created by the
National Security Act of 1947. [Ref. 130:p. 30] It is the
President's "principal office within the White House Staff
for national security policies and objectives is the
National Security Council." [Ref.- 131:p. 2-3] There are
four members of the NSC. They are the President (who serves
as Chairman), the Vice President, the Secretary of State,
and the Secretary of Defense. [Ref. 132:p. 614] The two
duties assigned the NSC in 1947 were:
1. Recommend action in actual and potential United States
military power, based on object ives , commitments , and
risks
.
2. Recommend action on matters of common interest to
federal activities concerned with national security.
[Ref. 133:p. 89]
Daily tasks of the NSC staff are supervised by the
President's Assistant for National Security Affairs. [Ref.
134: p. 26] "The characteristics, goals, and tempo of
national readiness planning stem from considerations of high
policy evolved from deliberations of this council," the
source of national security policy guidance in the
President. [Ref. 135:p. 2]
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As with many organizations in the executive branch, the
NSC can be used as the President sees fit. "Because each
President has used the NSC in his own way, its actual role
and responsibilities have varied widely." [Ref. 136:p. 5]
Odean identified the following roles played by the assistant
to the President for national security affairs and his
staff
:
1. Personal staff to the President.
2. Policy development.
3. Decision-forcing process.
4. Managing the decision process.
5. Overseeing the implementation of policies. [Ref.
137:pp. 5-6]
Of primary concern in the Planning Phase of PPBS is policy
development, for from these policies the national priorities
are established. These priorities are essential to the
Planning process.
National policy is rarely developed at the spur of the
moment. Clark and Legere identified six questions that
arise in determining national policy:
1. What implications do major domestic and international
trends have for national security policy arrangements?
2. What are the merits of the main alternatives for
centering policy responsibility and initiative in the
White House, the State Department, or other
inst i tut ion?
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3. What should be the functions of the White House staff
and its relations with the departments and agencies,
including the Bureau of the Budget and the
intelligence community?
4. How are major defense questions affected by the
relations of the civilian leaders with the
professional military in DOD?
5. What are the relative advantages of a comprehensive
codification of national security policy versus ad hoc
guidance?
6. What is the best way to assure performance and follow-
through? [Ref. 138:p. 11]
B. EVOLUTION
The President is responsible for establishing national
security policy. [Ref. 139:p. 10] "A clear statement of
purpose universally understood is the outstanding guarantee
of effective administration," or "the mission must be defined."
[Ref. 140:p. 35] Establishing a clear mission is one of the
tasks of the National Security Council. Yoshpe stated that
the National Security Council achieves three things:
1. Periodically appraises the Nation's foreign risks,
commitments, military strengths, and domestic economic
capabilities .
2. Endeavors to strike a proper balance among those items
in #1.
3. Provides the medium for basic assumptions and national
policy objectives on which military strategic and
resources mobilization planning is founded. [Ref.
lAl:p. 2]
All the achievements are critical for providing direction in
the Planning Phase of PPBS
.
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To make sound decisions, the President must have
accurate information concerning the problems confronting
him. Clark and Legere noted that the President will always
be faced with the following problems: acquiring information,
identifying issues, making decisions, coordinating, and
assuring performance. [Ref. 142:pp. 56-57] They also
described the use of the NSC by four Presidents: President
Truman (1947-1953) used the NSC strictly in an advisory
nature; President Eisenhower (1953-1961) used the NSC as a
central vehicle for formulating and promulgating policy and
a primary means of imparting presidential direction and
coherence to departments and agencies; President Kennedy
(1961-1963) used the NSC as a Presidential staff to manage
issues identified by him; and President Johnson (1963-1969)
used the NSC as a method of tight control over items that
were of interest to him. The staff became a selective
intelligence processor, but since the President wanted "open
options," no guidance restricted agency operations and plan-
ning. [Ref. 143: pp. 58,60,70,82]
President Reagan has used the NSC as a crisis manager.
For example, the President called a meeting of the NSC to
discuss responses to the Russian downing of a Korean
Airliner [Ref. 144:p. 7] and Admiral Poindexter was
instrumental in planning the capture of the Achille Lauro
hijackers [Ref. 145:p. A14].
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The concerns of Congress with the NSC and the budget
process were best expressed in 1961: "NSC deliberations
should be related more closely to the budget process and in
particular ''that the perspectives of the secretaries of
state and defense are brought to bear on an ordering of
national priorities at the target-setting stage of the
annual budget preparation.'" [Ref. 146:p. 107]
C. BUDGET
Within the executive branch of the federal government,
decisions affecting national security objectives, strategy,
policy, and force employment are made in two principal
forums: the National Security Council (NSC) system and
the defense budget process. [Ref. 147:p. 64]
The National Security Council has an input in both
processes. We know that requirements are based on plans.
"The national objectives relating to defense are recommended
to the President by the National Security Council." [Ref.
148:p. 58] The President will then determine " in broad
terms the policies and objectives of American and foreign
military programs." [Ref. 149:p. 59]
The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 gave the Secre-
tary of Defense, under the President and National Security
Council, two distinct lines of authority: a direct line
through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to Unified and
Specified Commands, and administrative control of depart-
ments through the Service Secretaries. [Ref. 150: p. I-l]
The Navy Programming Manual notes the importance of the NSC
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upon the Planning Phase of PPBS , and states that the purpose
of the NSC "involves the security policy of the U.S." [Ref.
151:p. II-l]
The JSPD evolves from the Joint Intelligence Estimate
for Planning ( JIEP) , which combined with the national policy
and other JCS planning documents give us the Joint Strategic
Planning System. Without the establishment of a security
policy by the NSC, resource assets would be expended to
cover unlikely threats to the national security. So deter-
mination of the military program is based largely on the
advice of the National Security Council and particularly the
Secretary of Defense [Ref. 152: p. 79]
There are innumerable examples of the intricate steps
involved in budget formulation. Yoshpe cited the example of
foreign aid as a good illustration of the budget process:
guidance by the President and NSC; coordination by Depart-
ment of State and DOD ; drafting programs by countries;
consolidating countries by region; Bureau of the Budget and
Congressional action; allocation of appropriated funds; and
determination of firm requirements and program execution.
[Ref. 153:p. 20]
The NSC also conducts an analysis of the POM from the
Secretary of Defense. Although this process is considered
part of the Programming Phase, the analysis centers upon how
the POM:
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1. Relates to Defense Guidance (outcome of the plannin;
phase ) .
2. Provides balance among force structure, modernization,
and readiness.
3. Demonstrates trade-offs. [Ref. 154:p. 22]
Thus, the POM could revert to a re-evaluation of the Plan-
ning Process if the NSC finds it deficient.
The size of the DOD budget and the interest in security
of the nation causes Congress, to focus attention on this
department. Brundage made an interesting observation con-
cerning the budgeting process:
Because of its size and paramount importance to the safety
of the country, the Defense budget gets more top-level
study, review, and discussion than any five other
departmental budgets together." [Ref. 155:pp. 131-132]
He also noted that the NSC considered the defense budgets
under Eisenhower, but during the Kennedy and Johnson admin-
istrations the defense budgets were taken up directly by the
President. [Ref. 156:p. 132] Korb considers the NSC system
as an "almost ideal civil-military balance" because the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is an advisor to
the NSC and military services all have input to the analysis
of interdepartmental and ad hoc groups, but all the groups
were chaired and controlled by civilians. [Ref. 157:p. 66]
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D. SUMMARY
The National Security Council(NSC) was intended to be
the point where policy and administration were linked at the
highest level. [Ref. 158:p. 93] In the case of the defense
budget, the NSC is most definitely involved. The Chairman
of the JCS is an advisor to the NSC and the Secretary of
Defense is a member. The NSC advises the President on the
integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies
relating to national security. [Ref. 159:p. 35] Yoshpe
notes that the development of a budget involves the entire
national security structure of the federal government. He
also notes "at the apex of this structure is the President."
[Ref. 160:p. 2]
Gelb in an article for The New York Times notes that the
NSC can sometimes give no policy at all when the Secretary
of State and Secretary of Defense disagree .[ Ref . 161:p. BIO]
He also points out that the NSC Staff members have a great
deal of power because they are between the President and the
Secretaries. They can add a cover memorandum over the
Secretary memorandum, and write the decision directives for
the President. [Ref. 162:p. A22]
Sponsorship of development and implementation of
military plans begins with the President, next in line is
the National Security Council, then the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and finally the individual Chiefs of Staff and the
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Chief of Naval Operations. [Ref. 163:p. 59] The policies
and objectives of American foreign and military programs are
determined by the President upon advice from the NSC. Then
JCS then determine force requirements, with review and
approval of the President and NSC. [Ref. 164:p. 59]
Without the direction received from the NSC, there could
be no plan upon which to base the JSPS, get a Defense
Guidance, develop a POM, and as a consequence have a budget
for national defense.
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VI. OTHER CONTRIBUTORS TO PLANNING
A. GENERAL
The President promulgates a comprehensive national
security policy, which forms the foundation for defense
planning. [Ref. 165:p. 15] The NSC advises the President
on integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies.
In addition to the four statutory members of the NSC (the
President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary
of Defense), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Director of Central Intelligence, and other departments and
agencies as required also sit in on the NSC meetings. [Ref.
166:p. 15]
There are no established guidelines or priorities to
establish policy. However, there are no shortage of advice
or advisors to the President in the formulation of policy,
Clark and Legere believe the President needs to address the
following questions when establishing policy:
1. Is the matter of truly national importance?
2. Does it involve the interests and responsibilities of
several departments and agencies?
3. Does it by nature, lend itself (or require) advance
planning and policy lead time, or is it a bridge to be
crossed only on arrival?
4. It is a matter already well and satisfactorily
understood in the federal government?
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5. Does it involve reassessment or redirection of
standing policies?
6. Is it a matter on which U . S. Policy can have an
effect or should try to have an effect? [Ref. 167:p.
28]
The answers to a-11 six questions will impact on the Planning
Phase of PPBS.
The threat to national security is normally associated
with foreign powers, Kertesz believes the following devel-
opments must be scrutinized in developing foreign policy:
1. NATO and the European Economic Community (EEC) must be
on guard against the Soviet Union.
2. Stregthen defense capabilities and cooperation in the
North Atlantic Area.
3. Communist are intensifying power grabs in under-
developed countries
4. American foreign policy is influenced by domestic
politics and economics in the United States. [Ref.
168: pp. 216-217]
To obtain information in order to conduct analysis and
evaluation of the threat posed to the national security, the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), the Intelligence and Research Bureau (INR),
and the National Security Agency (NSA) provide collection
and assessment services to decision-making authority. To
develop effective systems to counter threats evaluated from
intelligence data, the Defense Resources Board (DRB) was
chartered by the Secretary of Defense. The DRB presently
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oversees the entire planning, programming, and budgeting
process in the DOD. [Ref. 169:pp. 18-19]
Since the concern of this thesis is for the Planning Phase
of the PPBS only the intelligence communities, the Defense
Resources Board (DRB) and public opinion will be covered in
the remainder of this chapter.
B. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
Lack of intelligence even in time of peace can have
catastrophic results. Faulty assessments behind the United
States failure at Pearl Harbor in 1941 are attributed,
according to Hill, to the following:
1
.
Error in estimating the technical effectiveness and
number of particular weapons available to the other
side
2. Failure to fully appreciate the effectiveness of the
other side's operational procedures.
3. Gauging the wider military implication of the
capabilities being analyzed. [Ref. 170: pp. 173-174]
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was founded under
the National Security Act of 1947. The CIA duties under the
National Security Act are:
1. To advise the National Security Council (NSC)
concerning National security matters.
2. To make recommendations to the NSC.
3. To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to
national security and provide appropriate dissemina-
tion of such intelligence within the government.
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4. To perform additional services of common concern as
the NSA determines can be more efficiently accomplished
centrally
.
5. To perform such other functions and duties related to
intelligence affecting national security as the NSC
may direct. [Ref. 171:pp. 260-261]
The CIA is responsible for the gathering of intelligence
on foreign powers. It is also the largest intelligence
Agency in the United States. Collins observes that the
Director of Central Intelligence (CD) develops overarching
guidance, objectives and policies for the entire
intelligence community and "prepares a consolidated National
Foreign Intelligence Program budget, with advice from the
program managers, departments, and agencies concerned, then
presents it to the President and Congress." [Ref. 172:p.
117] He also notes that the intelligence community can
function effectively only if customers keep it suff4ciently
informed a in timely fashion, and key intelligence figures
are well enough informed about U.S. purposes, policies,
plans, and programs to furnish proper support. [Ref. 173:p.
119]
The State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(INR) does not collect intelligence, but rather coordinates
research on governments, business, commerce, cultures to
underpin U. S. foreign policy. [Ref. 174:p. 115]
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was established in
1961 by Secretary McNamara to provide him and the Joint
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Chiefs of Staff with a centralized source of intelligence.
[Ref. 175: p. 204] This intelligence agency is always
headed by an active duty flag officer. The intelligence
collected by the DIA is organized into four categories:
1. Basic intelligence concerns fundamental attributes of
foreign forces, physical geography, and target
information
.
2. Current intelligence concentrates on time-sensitive
matters that might have a major impact on America's
military establishment.
3. Scientific and technological intelligence follow
foreign progress in the field of weapons and
equipment
.
4. Estimates of strengths, weaknesses, and probable
courses of future action for enemies, allies, and un-
committed countries, using imports from the first
three categories .[ Ref . 176:p. 116]
The Fleet Intelligence Support Activity, HUMINT,
Technical Sensor Collection, Imagery Intelligence, ELINT
Centers, Intelligence Production Activities, Scientific and
technical intelligence, Intelligence Data Handling Systems,
Management Headquarters (General Intelligence), Defense
Special Security System, and Intelligence Communications all
come under the General Defense Intelligence Program(GDIP)
,
and thus under the auspices of the DIA. [Ref. 177:pp. N-1-2]
Shribman's New York Times article concerning the Soviet
downing of a Korean Air Lines Boeing 747 shows a glimpse of
the vast, intricate data collection at 4,120 intercept
stations around the globe. The data collected on the air-
line downing included Soviet pilot to ground communications,
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radar emissions, and the sequencing of the engagement,
arming, and firing of the missile. This glimpse also tells
intelligence analysts the Soviet command and control, what
needs to be done to counter, what resources are required,
and subsequently what must be included in the defense
budget. [Ref. 178:p. A7]
The National Security Agency (NSA) is almost as old as
the CIA, having been operating since 1951. This agency
performs two unique services:
1. The interception, traffic analysis, and crypt-analysis
of electronically transmitted messages provides other-
wise unavailable insights into the plans, operations,
and procedures of friend and foe alike.
2. Regulates, supervises, and integrates cryptosecuri ty
activities of those U. S. Armed Forces and govern-
mental bodies that need to communicate covertly.
[Ref. 179:p. 116]
NSA directs the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), thus
controlling Cryptologic Activities, Cryptologic Communica-
tions, and Management Headquarters (Cryptologic). [Ref.
180:p. N-1] This agency is "both supersecret and super-
sensitive, is routinely ruled by an active duty military man
with a civilian Deputy, who does double duty as the Agency's
senior cryptographic expert." [Ref. 181:p. 124] This agency
is obviously of great importance because it will be
collecting data from the most sensitive of communication.
The Intelligence Priorities for Strategic Planning
(IPSP) establishes military intelligence targets and
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priorities for a ten year period. It provides guidance and
advice to the Secretary of Defense and military services on
planning, collection, and production of intelligence and
informs the Director of the CIA of intelligence priorities
to support military strategy. [Ref, 182:p. 47] The U.S.
intelligence community attempts to promote cooperation to
meet both national and departmental intelligence needs with-
out excessive duplication of effort. [Ref. 183:p. 115]
C. DEFENSE RESOURCES BOARD
Throughout the history of the DOD there has been a need
for direction and oversight of the DOD Planning Process.
"The DRB (Defense Resource Board) will have oversight
responsibility for the planning process (of the DOD PPB
System)." [Ref. 184:p. 3] This established the DRB as a key
participant in the Planning Phase of the PPBS in the DOD.
The DRB was established in April 1979 to help improve the
PPBS, primarily increasing efficiency by supervising OSD
(Office of Secretary of Defense) review of Service POMs
and the budget submissions. [Ref. 185:p. 6] "The primary
role of the DRB is to help SECDEF (Secretary of Defense)
manage the entire PPBS process." [Ref. 186:p. E9.5.1]
Membership of the Defense Resources Board (DRB) consists of:
Deputy Secretary of Defense (Chairman); Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff; Secretary of the Navy; Secretary of
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the Air Force; Under Secretaries of Defense for; Policy,
Research and Engineering; Assistant Secretaries of Defense
for: Comptroller, Health Affairs, International Security
Affairs, International Security Policy, Manpower, Reserve
Affairs and Logistics; Director, Program Analysis and
Evaluation; and Associate Director, Office of Management and
Budget. [Ref. 187:p. 3-10]
The DRB receives a draft of the Threat Assessment,
Policy, Strategy, and Force Planning Guidance which identify
major changes and issues raised in submission by POD
Components. The result of meetings with the DRB is a draft
of Defense for Plans. The DRB makes recommendations to the
Secretary of Defense concerning "reduction of the strategy
capabilities mismatching, the associated JCS - required
force tables and risk assessment and any remaining
unresolved problems or issues. [Ref. 188:p. 22]
The publication of the Defense Guidance completes the
Planning Phase of PPBS . To ensure that the DRB is not over
burdened during the Planning Phase, a Defense Guidance
Steering Group (DGSG) resolves minor issues at lowest
levels, bring only important issues to the DRB for resolu-
tion. This DGSG is composed of senior representatives of
all the DRB members and chaired by the Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy (DUSDP). It has
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"representatives at the Deputy Assistant Secretary and Two-
Star General Officer Level." [Ref. 189:p. 10]
The DRB accept personal appraisals of major issues from
Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands as well as
assessments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and Military
Departments. [Ref. 190:p. 4] TheDRB therefore carries out
a very critical role in the Planning Phase of the PPBS in
matching available resources to an evaluated threat.
D. PUBLIC OPINION
The federal government of the United States is a
Republic. As such it represents the will or desire of a
majority of its citizens. An outstanding discussion of
public opinion is by Korb's observation that "one of the
greatest paradoxes of the American political system is the
fact that the public is not informed about national security
issues, yet public support is necessary to carry out
national strategy, particularly one that carries risk."
[Ref. 191:p. 61] Korb believes that public opinion sets
limits or boundaries on national strategy by setting limits
on how much of their resources go to defense. [Ref. 192:p.
61] These limits of course impact the planning phase in the
PPBS process, particularly the DRB and the Secretary of
Defense in preparation of the Defense Guidance.
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The national press is a major source of public opinion.
Although it reports facts, included will be biases of the
writer or news anchor, whether reporting surpluses due to
deflation [Ref. 193:p. B9], deficiencies in combat
readiness, [Ref. 194:pp. 1-2], or failure of weapon systems.
[Ref. 195:pp. Al, A18] The interested public will be
effected by the news reports, and will notify the people who
count significantly in the Budget process Congress.
Euske stated that "the only way to plan for the un-
expected is to have a process that is responsive to whatever
the situation is." [Ref. 196:p. 18] Halloran stated in a
newspaper article that the Armed Forces were cutting back
troop strength in face of Congressional budget costs. [Ref.
197:p. A12] Planning also considered public, or Congress-
ional reaction to media disclosures. Yet another example is
local opposition to a National Guard base in Tennessee.
Alternative plans are being considered if Congress does not
approve the National Guard proposal. [Ref.l98:p. A23]
Although not considered in assessing a threat, countering
with resources, and writing into the Defense Guidance,
public opinion is considered in the Planning Phase of PPBS
in order to have alternative courses of action by priority.
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E. SUMMARY
All the items discussed in this chapter have an influence
on the Planning Phase of PPBS in DOD. The intelligence
community is critical in determining not only the threat,
but counters to the threat. The Defense Resources Board
evaluates the Defense Guidance to ensure strategy and
capabilities match. Public opinion must be considered to




The size of the United States Defense Department can be
shown with the following statement:
Defense acquisition is the largest business enterprise in
the world. Annual purchases by the Department of Defense
(DOD) total almost $170 billion -- more than the combined
purchases of General Motors, Exxon, and IBM combined.
[Ref. 199:p. 3]
Because of the huge funds involved, and the average
citizen's abhorence of taxes, it is incumbent upon officials
in DOD to plan carefully. Planning is crucial to the trans-
lation of broad national security goals and objectives into
balanced programs. Planning is the weakest, least explicit
phase of PPBS. [Ref. 200:p. 31] Schick defines planning in
the context of budgeting as "the determination of objec-
tives, the evaluation of alternative courses of action, and
the authorization of selected programs." [Ref. 201:p. 2]
The Defense Budget process has been evolving along with
the DOD organization since its founding in 1947. "The
evolution of the defense budget process since the founding
of the department in 1947 is characterized by a tension—
inevitable and, in all likelihood, healthy— between cen-
tralization and decentralization." [Ref. 202:p. 570] Fox
identified four weaknesses in the planning phase of PPBS
prior to 1981: undisciplined planning, silent first P of
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PPBS , inadequate input from the area commanders, and no link
from planning to programming .[ Ref . 203:p. 39]
Smithies observed that decentralization involves some
delegation of decision-making authority, which inevitably
involves some conflict in the point of view between central
and lower level authorities, but may lead to better results.
[Ref. 204:p. 1] Deputy Defense Secretary Carlucci promul-
gated two memorandums in March and April 1981 with a goal to
improving procurement and the budget planning process. The
major themes were: decentralization (strengthen the role of
service Secretaries), cost control (hold down costs),
strengthen the industrial base (facilitate defense industry
planning). [Ref. 205:p. 76] Those policies are in effect
today
.
The threat of a future war has intensified the study of
resource requirements. [Ref. 206: p. 53] Of particular
concern is the need for careful planning. Dawson was correct
when he predicted that PPBS would gain general viability,
acceptability, and effectiveness around 1990, but only in
DOD. The rest of the federal government has rejected his
optimistic appraisal. [Ref. 207:p. 16] Because long-range
planning deals with future events, it is difficult work.
Forecasting even a few years into the future is an
intellectual task so formidable, that only modest success is
attained. [Ref. 208:p. 21] The Navy planning system at the
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start of PPBS in 1961 considered long-range planning ten to
twenty years in the future, and a mid-range plan from the
present to ten years in the future. [Ref. 209:p. 4] To
ensure planning and control of budgeting, the PPBS was
officially initiated by Defense Secretary McNaraara a quarter
of a century ago. Mosher pre-dated McNamara by six years
when he outlined four trends developing in the budget
process :
1. The drive toward greater and greater organizational
unification has had tremendous effect upon both
planning and budgeting.
2. Notable progress in correlation and integration of
planning and programming process, not only among
organizations concerned, but also among substantive
elements of planning content and among the terras of
time covered by different plans and programs.
3. The role and importance of the budget in the total
military picture is being transformed.
4. Magnification of the complexity of both the
programming and budgeting process. [Ref. 210:pp. 57-
58]
Little has changed from the trends noted three decades
ago. The trend now is toward decentralization; the service
secretaries have been granted more autonomy. PPBS had
seven major goals:
1. Orient planning around major missions as a means of
eliminating outdated and unrealistic interservice
competition .
2. Relate resource inputs to military output in terms of
dollars and physical units in order to establish a
feasible schedule of military output.
64
3. Coordinate long-range planning with budgets so as to
dovetail funding decisions with program decisions.
4. Provide a means of continuously appraising programs
and eliminate as much as possible the negative effect
of the annual budget cycle on the ability to respond
to changing military needs.
5. Provide a timely system of progress reporting as a
means of control.
6. Provide a routine capability for making cost-
effectiveness studies of alternative force structure.
7. Develop an integrated OSD management system. [Ref.
211: p. 87]
The goals established twenty years ago have, on the whole,
been achieved. The era of limited budgets may bring some
changes in the future.
Governments are composed of people. The role of people
in the U.S. federal government, particularly the executive
branch, can be summarized as follows: the personality of the
individuals, rather than the office per se, has determined
the key actors in the different administrations.
The President is usually the key actor in the policy
process. He sets the broad outline or the tone or the
atmosphere in which the decisions are made. [Ref. 212:p. 70]
The NSC exists to assist the President. It sets forth broad
goals to ensure the security of the United States. It is
assisted by several intelligence agencies, of which the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the one which is
primary advisor to the President and NSC on national foreign
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intelligence. [Ref. 213:p. 116] The Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff is also advised by the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) and National Security Agency (NSI).
To achieve any effective outcome, standards must be set.
Collins identifies several standards, all of which must be
met in order to ensure an effective product of defense
planning: competent planners, team play, goal-oriented
audience, a spectrum of options, a spectrum of plans,
realistic resource allocation, timely output, and impartial
inspection by professionals. [Ref. 214:pp. 9-12] "An
ancient adage says geniuses should prepare defense plans
that can be easily implemented by idiots (keep it simple)."
[Ref. 215:p. 181] Additionally, Kingston-McCloughry notes
"it is important that partisan approaches are avoided at the
staff planning level." [Ref. 216:p. 100] The ultimate
outcome is a JSPD promulgated by the JCS , which also
initiates the planning phase in the PPBS annual cycle. [Ref.
217:p. II-l]
The JSPD contains military appraisal of the threat to
U.S. interests and objectives world-wide, a statement of
recommended military objectives derived from national objec-
tives, and recommended military strategy to attain national
objectives. [Ref. 218:p. 121] The DRB reviews the JSPD and
makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, who sub-
sequently promulgates the Defense Guidance. The Defense
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Guidance ends the Planning Phase and begins the Programming
Phase of the PPBS . [Ref. 219:p. 22]
B. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Presidents have appointed commissions with regularity to
review ways of improving the government. One such commision
reviewed the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
The Hoover Commission found much to criticize in the
operations of the JCS. The chiefs were too remote from
other parts of the defense establishment and they were
"too detached from the vitally important political,
economic, and scientific factors that must enter into all
valid strategic plans." [Ref. 220:p. 131]
The pressure currently in Congress to revamp the JCS and
give more authority to the Chairman of the JCS is a
reflection of the above criticism. The Chairman of the JSC
is currently a member of the DRB, sits in on the NSC
meetings, and is the principal military advisor to the
President and Secretary of Defense. The Chairman will soon
receive reports directly from field commanders rather than
filtered through the JCS. This change is by executive
directive. [Ref. 221:p. A18] Additionally, the Chairman
would also be required to develop an additional JSPD which
details the priorities, and optimal combination of defense
resources to meet expected budget limitations rather than
relying on the Secretary of Defense Staff. [Ref. 222:p. 37]
The pressure in the national media is not all in favor
of change. Bennett advises against changing the JCS because
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inter-service cooperation will be undermined, not enhanced.
Additionally he feels the JCS would become more removed as
advisors to the President and Secretary of Defense. [Ref.
223:p. A23] Since there is no tradition of a General Staff
in the United States, there is no individual qualified to
serve as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in the capacity of
unbiased service officer. Additionally, the Chairman of the
JCS already serves on the DRB and the NSC. As Bennett
observed, elevating a Service Chief will most likely be
disruptive .
C. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
If everyone in the world thought alike or was a
pacifist, there would be no need for a national defense
force. "In a truly stable world, there is really no over-
riding need for long-range plans." [Ref. 224:p. 19]
However, the real world is not stable, so planning must
definitely be considered, in particular top-down direction
or guidance. [Ref. 225:p. 11] The programmer depends on a
planning system that estimates resource needs, reflects
agreed-upon policies and procedures, and yields balanced
resource mixes. [Ref. 226:p. 93]
One defect in PPBS is that it does not have any way of
addressing international economic problems. [Ref. 227:p. 11]
Brown proposes a unique idea: "the purpose of national
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security deliberations should not be to maximize military
strength but to maximize national security." [Ref. 228:p.
23] He considers energy, food, soil, science, ecology, and
social structure contributors to national security and re-
quiring coordinated international response. Brown believes
that "the traditional military concept of ^national
security' is growing less adequate as non-military threats
grow more formidable." [Ref. 229:p. 24] Although his idea
has merit, the cost to maintain a defense establishment
would probably be less than supporting the rest of the world
economically. Additionally, the Planning Phase would
require vast resources, which Congress most likely will not
relinquish
.
Another concern is the increased influence of civilian
officials into the concerns of military tacticians. Con-
gress in particular is guilty of these actions. Kintner
noted that "during the past several years, professional
military men have had less and less to say as to how such
decisions on military posture are made and have had less and
less influence on the actual choices." [Ref. 230:pp. 405-
406] He proposed the military be given adequate representa-
tion on the strategy formulating group and planning and
conduct of military operations be restored to the military
as its primary province. [Ref. 231:p. 410] The inclusion of
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the Chairman of the JCS on the DRB and NSC has resolved a
lot of the problems Kintner highlighted.
The most uncertain, unsettling problem with the Planning
Phase of PPBS process will be the new role of the Chairman
of the JCS. If his biases from his past service days still
exist, then his actions in the Planning Phase will be detri-
mental to other services. Other alternatives would be to
add all the Service Chiefs to the DRB and NSC, or create an
entirely new Service independent of the Army, Navy, Air
Force or Marine Corps.
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